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ABSTRACT
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Doctor of Health Administration
in the College of Health Professions
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As the United State healthcare system continues to evolve from a
reimbursement system based on volume to one based on value, understanding
the relationship between physician quality metrics such as patient satisfaction
and clinical quality metrics is extremely important. In order to improve value by
effectuating behavior change, physician financial incentives must be designed
based on desired outcomes. Understanding the relationship between
performance indicators and aligning incentives is integral to successfully
incentivizing physician behavior change. This study assessed the relationship
between patient satisfaction and clinical quality in an ambulatory setting and
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determined that they are separate domains, but certain types of clinical quality
are identifiable by patients and thus impact satisfaction.

1

1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1

BACKGROUND AND NEED
The United States healthcare delivery system is undergoing significant

change as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) that
was signed into law by President Obama in 2010 (Sommers, 2012). While the
ACA has many provisions that impact various parts of the healthcare system, of
note is the introduction of accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) and other
quality based reimbursement structures, which incentivize healthcare providers
via a “carrot and stick” approach to keep their patients healthier (Gold, 2014).
Whether or not ACOs and revised financial incentive structures will be successful
in improving the quality of healthcare provided is yet to be determined. However,
the very existence of these changes, and the associated regulations, have
created a transformational process whereby the healthcare reimbursement
system is evolving from one based on volume (reimbursement for each unit or
service provided) to one based on value (reimbursement for keeping patients
healthier and/or meeting quality criteria). In general, value is a measure of the
output an organization, individual, country or other entity achieves relative to the
costs that are incurred to create the output (Porter, 2010). In healthcare, value is
typically defined as the overall health outcomes, or quality of health achieved per
dollar spent on achieving that outcome (Porter, 2010). It is based on this
definition that the United States is often seen as one of the lowest value
healthcare systems in the developed world (Davis, Stremikis, Squires, & and
Schoen, 2014).In fact, in 2012, the United States spent sixteen point two percent
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(16.2%) of its gross domestic product (“GDP”) on healthcare, which ranked first
among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
countries, yet its average life expectancy in 2011 was 78.4 years, which is below
the OECD average and ranks twenty-sixth of thirty-four OECD countries (OECD,
2013). Thus, it is understandable why regulations attempting to improve the
value of the United States healthcare system have been enacted.
As part of this attempted transition to reimbursement based on value or
quality from reimbursement based on volume, financial incentives, physician
reimbursement and overall physician compensation are increasingly becoming
tied to quality based factors such as patient satisfaction results and performance
on clinical measures such as those provided by the healthcare effectiveness data
and information set (HEDIS). There is not currently a clear, consistent
mechanism by which to measure the quality of healthcare services administered
by individual physicians and other healthcare providers, nor is there a definitive
answer to which of the employed measures ultimately impact clinical outcomes.
However, according to the Medical Group Management Association (“MGMA”),
the transition is starting to occur where physicians are witnessing their
reimbursement from payers begin to be linked to performance on patient
satisfaction results and other clinical performance measures and less based
strictly on the volume of healthcare services provided (MGMA, 2014). Further,
according to MGMA, primary care physicians (“PCPs”) indicated that 5.96% of
their total compensation was linked to quality; and specialists (“SCPs”) noted that
an average of 5.70% of their total compensation was driven by performance on
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quality measures in 2013 (MGMA, 2014). Performance on patient satisfaction
was also cited as a factor of total compensation with PCPs indicating a slight
increase in the percentage of compensation tied to patient satisfaction in 2013
over the 2% in 2012; and SCPs stating that an average of 2.31% of their
compensation was based on performance on patient satisfaction in 2013
compared to 1.61% that was reported in 2012 (MGMA, 2014). The same survey
showed the median compensation for PCPs to be $232,989 and for SCPs to be
$402,233, meaning that for PCPs, average compensation for quality was
$13,886.14; and for patient satisfaction it was $5824.73. While for SCPs average
compensation based on quality was $22,927.28; and patient satisfaction was
$9,291.58 (MGMA, 2014). Other surveys have shown that up to 59% of
physicians have at least some portion of their compensation tied to patient
satisfaction results (Zgierska, 2014).
While there has been significant change in reimbursement to physicians,
this change has happened in a relatively short period of time. Many commercial
payers base their reimbursement on Medicare, which was enacted in 1965 when
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Title XVIII Amendment to the 1935
Social Security Act (Sanaz Hariri, 2007). In 2013, Medicare represented $585.7
billion in expenditures, which was approximately 20 percent of the total national
health expenditure (“NHE”) for that year (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2014). Payments to physicians represented 12% of total Medicare
spending, the third highest individual category of spending as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014)

From its beginning in 1965, Medicare reimbursed physicians and hospitals
primarily based on the amounts that were charged, in accordance with the
methodology of most private insurers at that time, namely Blue Cross and Blue
Shield (Wilensky, Medicare Physician Payments: Where We've Been; Where We
Need to Go, 2012). Because reimbursement for Medicare and privately insured
patients was based on physicians’ or hospitals’ historical charged amounts, there
was an inherent incentive to progressively increase charges in order to maximize
revenues (Starr, 1982). It is projected that as a result of allowing physicians to
increase reimbursement by increasing their charges, the rate of growth in
spending averaged 13 percent annually from 1967 through 1974 (Holtz-Eakin,
2004). The first major change to the Medicare physician reimbursement
structure came in 1975, with the implementation of the Medicare Economic Index
(“MEI”), which provided the first type of cap on charge based increases (Dutton,
1981). Even with the implementation of the MEI to cap charge increases for
physician services, spending continued to rise drastically from volume increases
(Wilensky, Medicare Physician Payments: Where We've Been; Where We Need
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to Go, 2012). In 1992, the resource based relative value scale (“RBRVS”) was
implemented as the revised physician fee schedule for Medicare (Sanaz Hariri,
2007). The RBRVS system, developed by researchers at Harvard University
School of Public Health, placed greater emphasis on the resources necessary to
perform a procedure and intended to correct the discrepancy that existed
between payment for interventional and non-interventional services (Sanaz
Hariri, 2007). The RBRVS system remains the fundamental reimbursement
structure for physicians today.
In almost every year since 2003, Congress has intervened to either grant
an increase in physician reimbursement or has acted to freeze reimbursement in
order to prevent a decrease that would have been required by the statutory
formula associated with the Sustainable Growth Rate (“SGR”) (Health Affairs,
2013) with the SGR finally being repealed by the Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”).The increases in spending, failure of the
SGR and the recognition that the current reimbursement system does not reward
quality are all factors that have contributed to the movement toward a revised,
value-based system (Sanghavi, 2013).
Clearly, a revision to the Medicare physician reimbursement structure has
been needed for quite some time. However, the push toward reimbursement tied
to value as opposed to being tied to volume can largely be attributed to the
changing market dynamics from provisions of the ACA. While the vast legislation
was meant to provide coverage for more American people, it also contains
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significant cost containment and health delivery reform provisions. Specifically,
the ACA includes requirements such as


“Allow providers organized as ACOs that voluntarily meet quality
thresholds to share in the cost savings they achieve for the Medicare
program. To qualify as an ACO, organizations must agree to be
accountable for the overall care of their Medicare beneficiaries, have
adequate participation of primary care physicians, define processes to
promote evidence-based medicine, report on quality and costs, and
coordinate care. (Shared savings program established January 1, 2012)”
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013)



“Create an Innovation Center within the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services to test, evaluate, and expand in Medicare, Medicaid,
and CHIP different payment structures and methodologies to reduce
program expenditures while maintaining or improving quality of care.
Payment reform models that improve quality and reduce the rate of cost
growth could be expanded throughout the Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP
programs. (Effective January 1, 2011)” (The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013).



“Establish a hospital value-based purchasing program in Medicare to pay
hospitals based on performance on quality measures and extend the
Medicare physician quality reporting initiative beyond 2010. (Effective
October 1, 2012)” (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013)
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The underlying theme of the cost containment and health system
performance sections of the ACA is that reimbursement should be tied to
quality and outcomes. And, in an historic announcement in early 2015 HHS
indicated that it had established the goal and framework to increase
payments tied to quality or value through alternative payment models to 30
percent of traditional Medicare payments by the end of 2016, and 50 percent
of payments to models such as ACOs or bundled payments by the end of
2018 (The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). In addition
to the ACO models and bundled payment options, the value based payment
incentives and penalties for physicians, some of which began before the ACA
but were solidified or made permanent by the ACA, currently include
Meaningful Use (“MU”) (and the previous electronic prescribing incentive),
Physician Quality Reporting System (“PQRS”) and the Value Based Payment
Modifier (“VBPM”) (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).


The MU program was initially designed to incentivize providers to
implement electronic health records (“EHR” or “EHRs”). There are
multiple stages of MU with the maximum incentive that an eligible
professional could receive being $44,000 over the five year period
(The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). In 2015, the
penalty phase of MU was implemented with downward payment
adjustments to providers that are eligible but decide not to participate
in the MU program of 1-2% depending on their electronic prescribing
results (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). The
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maximum penalty for failure to meet MU will reach 5% of the Medicare
physician fee schedule amount by 2019 (The Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2014). The detailed MU measures include core
measures such as maintaining an active medication list, providing
patients with an electronic copy of their health information and
providing clinical summaries for patients at each office visit, among
others; menu measures such as sending reminders to patients for
preventive/follow-up care or submitting data to immunization registries;
and clinical quality measures such as blood pressure measurement for
hypertension or adult weight screening and follow-up among others
(The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). There is a
significant component related to patient communication and outreach
in addition to systems capabilities and clinical quality.


The PQRS program is a reporting program that uses a combination of
incentive payments and negative payment adjustments to promote
reporting of quality information by eligible professionals (“EPs”). The
program provides an incentive payment to practices with EPs that
satisfactorily report data on quality measures for covered Physician
Fee Schedule (PFS) services furnished to Medicare Part B Fee-forService beneficiaries (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2015). For 2015, there are 255 measures included in PQRS (The
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Measures come
from multiple sources, including those provided by the National
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Committee for Quality Assurance’s (“NCQA”) HEDIS and other medical
specialty societies. There are six (6) domains, which include
communication and care coordination, community/population health,
effective clinical care, efficiency and cost reduction, patient safety; and
person and caregiver-centered experience and outcomes (The Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Most practices are
required to report nine (9) or more measures across at least three (3)
different domains (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2015). Some of the requirements vary depending on the size of the
group participating; and whether or not the participant is part of an
ACO. For those EPs that elect not to participate in PQRS, the penalty
in 2015 is 2% of their Medicare PFS.


The VBPM was instituted in The ACA which “requires that Medicare
establish a value-based payment modifier that provides for differential
payment under the Medicare PFS based upon the quality of care
furnished compared to cost during a performance period. It requires
that the Value Modifier be applied to specific physicians and groups of
physicians determined as appropriate starting January 1, 2015, and to
all physicians and groups of physicians by January 1, 2017. The
statute requires the Value Modifier to be budget neutral. Budget
neutrality means that, in aggregate, the increased payments to high
performing physicians and groups of physicians equal the reduced
payments to low performing physicians and groups of physicians” (The
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Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). The VBPM is
closely linked to PQRS and provides additional incentive or penalty
based on PQRS performance and reporting. The VBPM does not apply
to participants in a Medicare ACO as they have other financial
incentives and reporting requirements that vary from the general
physician population (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2015).
Under MACRA, these incentive and penalty models were consolidated
under the newly created Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (“MIPS”)
beginning in 2019. Additionally, two different tracks were enacted, the MIPS track
and the Alternative Payment Models (“APM”) track (The Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2015). MIPS is a budget neutral model that has incentives for
EHR (meaningful use measures) weighted at 25%, Quality (PQRS measures)
weighted at 30%, Resource Use (Cost measures) weighted at 30%, and Clinical
Improvement (care coordination, patient satisfaction and access measures)
weighted at 15% (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).
Physicians may opt out of MIPS if they opt for the APM track that requires
participation in two-sided risk based models, quality measurement and potentially
Patient Centered Medical Home (“PCMH”) (The Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2015). The trend in reimbursement for physician services is
clearly in the direction of reimbursement and incentives tied to clinical quality,
patient satisfaction and overall cost control; and incentives are being enacted
with the intent of changing physician behaviors.
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There has been significant research as to the impact of financial
incentives on improving quality in healthcare. For example, a study of the
Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration project found that hospitals in
the demonstration initially showed positive improvements in quality compared to
a control group. However, the effects did not last, and at the five-year point of the
demonstration, there were no significant differences in performance scores
between participating hospitals and the comparison group of hospitals (Werner,
2011). However, other studies have demonstrated different results. Researchers
at Dartmouth College and the National Bureau for Economic Research (“NBER”)
assessed results of the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, a
pilot project put forth by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)
that ran from 2005 to 2010. In the pilot program, physicians from ten large
practices received bonuses for meeting lower cost growth than local controls and
for meeting quality targets (Colla, 2012). The study showed an improvement in
quality but a less significant impact on the growth of spending (Colla, 2012).
The healthcare industry is composed of many financial incentives,
oftentimes competing, including the manner in which physicians are paid, the
reimbursement weights for certain services; and in the ways health insurance
coverage, co-payments, and deductibles are structured for patients, among
others (Loewenstein, 2012). While the literature remains mixed as to the impact
of financial incentives on transforming physician behavior related to quality
improvement and administrative processes (Health Affairs: Health Policy Briefs,
2012), economic theory would suggest that individuals, including physicians, are
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self-interested utility maximizers and would respond to financial incentives
(Loewenstein, 2012). Additionally, behavioral economics tells us that in certain
cases, individuals lack information to make rational decisions, and at other times
they appear to act contrary to their own known interests, such as when
individuals overeat, decline to take a medication, or opt not to wear seat belts
(Loewenstein, 2012).
Following the logic that physicians will respond to financial incentives,
many experts remain critical of performance incentives tied to patient satisfaction
because the things that “satisfy” patients may not be in their best interest (Pho,
2012). An often cited example is that of antibiotics or pain medications
(Sonnenberg, 2014). In both instances, there is information asymmetry between
the physician and the patient. The patient may think they “need” antibiotics, or
they may “want” pain medications, but neither may be the best clinical practice
depending on the situation. Physicians have the information to make the best
determination, but patient satisfaction results could be harmed and ultimately
their compensation impacted if they deviate from what the patient desires.
The topic of information asymmetry and uncertainty in healthcare is not
new. In Kenneth Arrow’s seminal paper Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care (1963) he explained that “uncertainty as to the quality of the
product is perhaps more intense here (medical care industry) than in any other
important commodity” (p. 951) (Arrow, 1963). Physicians are our most educated
and highly trained medical professionals, thereby creating an information
asymmetry between physicians and patients. While it is understood that this
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information asymmetry may vary across physician-patient relationships, generally
speaking, it may be difficult for patients to assess the quality of the medical care
that they receive from a physician due to the inherent uncertainty related to
information asymmetry. It has been shown that when information regarding
quality isn’t available before consumers make a purchase, quality may
deteriorate to the lowest level in the market (Akerlof, 1970). Basically, (Akerlof,
1970) showed that since purchasers cannot tell the difference between high
quality used cars and lemons (poor quality used cars), all used cars sell for the
same price, regardless of quality (Haas-Wilson, 2001). Accordingly, owners of
high quality used cars have no incentive to sell their cars and only low quality
used cars (lemons) are sold (Haas-Wilson, 2001). Luckily, we have not
witnessed this sort of “race to the bottom” with regard to physician services,
primarily because in the market for physician services, quality is at least partially
endogenous and physicians have control over the quality of service that they sell;
and patients can obtain some information about quality of a physician, or at least
perceived signals of quality such as word-of-mouth referrals (Haas-Wilson,
2001). Over time, however, signals of quality can become ineffective (HaasWilson, 2001). Since Arrow’s time, access to medical information has expanded
significantly, primarily due to the internet. It is hoped that improved access to
medical information could generate more informed healthcare consumers who
are able to select a physician offering the lowest quality-adjusted prices (HaasWilson, 2001).
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1.2

PROBLEM STATEMENT
The ACA has put forth multiple policy changes designed to change

healthcare provider behavior. Specifically, hospitals are already experiencing
Medicare reimbursement tied to patient satisfaction results; and Medicare
physician reimbursement is directly impacted by patient satisfaction results as
well. Commercial payers are at varying stages of factoring patient satisfaction
into reimbursement models. Additionally, various quality measures have been
incorporated into physician compensation and reimbursement, most often
measures related to performance on HEDIS. Because there is not a common
methodology for measuring patient satisfaction or defining quality, there is limited
data that assesses the relationship between patient satisfaction and quality of
care provided by physicians in the ambulatory setting. It is not known whether
clinical, technical quality (as measured by described indicators) is a determinant
of patient satisfaction. Thus, it is difficult to develop appropriate financial
incentives when the implications are not fully understood. This study’s objective
is to assess the association between patient satisfaction and physician clinical
quality, specifically whether patient satisfaction results are a signal for physician
quality and whether performance on quality measures is a predictor of overall
patient satisfaction.

1.3

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Are patients able to recognize clinical technical quality and thus they are

more satisfied with physicians that perform better on quality metrics? Or, are
patient satisfaction and clinical quality unrelated measures? Our hypotheses are
as follows:
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Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and
physician performance on global quality metrics.
Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and
physician performance on clinical metrics related to antibiotic prescribing
practice.
Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and
physician performance on preventive healthcare quality metrics.
Hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and
physician performance on chronic disease management metrics.
Hypothesis 5: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and
physician generic prescribing practice metrics.
Hypothesis 6: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and
physician performance on vaccine related healthcare quality metrics.

1.4

INTENDED POPULATION
Assessing this relationship will help to determine whether there is

congruence between quality performance and patient perceived quality in the
way of satisfaction and therefore provide insight to appropriate financial incentive
structures for physicians. Ultimately, by more clearly understanding the
relationship between patient satisfaction and physician clinical quality, more
informed policy decisions could be made to incentivize appropriate behavior. This
information could be useful to payers, provider organizations and policy makers
charged with designing complex reimbursement to change the current healthcare
system.
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2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES
In total physician penalties related to quality and performance will reach 7-

9% of the Medicare PFS depending on group size by 2017 (The Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). These incentive and penalty programs
are designed based on the general underlying microeconomic theory that
physicians are profit maximizers and thus will respond to incentives (Pauly,
1978). It has been shown that physicians dictate quantity and specifically, the
treatment that the patient requires and often make this decision based on factors
that affect the physician (McGuire T. , 2000). After controlling for normal demandside variables, including demand-price, income and clinical need, supply of care
variables including price, physician attitudes and partnership incentives directly
influence what happens to the patient in terms of treatment (Gaynor, 1995). In
fact, the discussion of the impact that financial incentives have on physician
behavior has been widely debated and investigated both in economics and
healthcare related disciplines (Shafrin J. , 2010).
Determining whether physicians are perfect agents for their patients,
meaning they make medical decisions solely based on what is best for the
patient; or whether physicians act as “homo economicus”, meaning they are strict
profit maximizers is integral to the discussion of incentives (Shafrin J. , 2011).
The most recognized study on the impact of financial incentives on medical
services is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (“HIE”). The original purpose
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of the HIE was to assess how much more medical care people would use if it
was free and what the consequences for their health were (RAND Health, 2015).
However, a sub-part of the study randomly assigned households to Fee-ForService (“FFS”) and capitated plans, allowing research on reimbursement
methodologies and healthcare utilization. Manning, et al (1987) showed that
members of capitated plans had 72% of the total expenditures of members in
FFS plans (Manning, 1987). Other studies have supported these results
(Hickson, 1987) (Shen, 2004). Shafrin (2010) showed that when surgeons are
compensated on a FFS basis as opposed to capitation, surgical rates were 78%
higher, even after controlling for adverse selection. These studies provide
evidence that financial incentives influence physician behavior, however, the
available studies focus on the mechanism of reimbursement, i.e. fee-for-service
or capitation versus incentives directed at certain quality metrics or service
indicators.
The overall analysis and understanding of physician payment is covered
within the economic literature on contracts and incentives, referred to as agency
theory (Milgrom, 1992). The underpinning of incentive contracts is that the effort
put forth by an individual or organization (the principal) is used to induce and
incentivize behaviors by another individual or organization (the agent) (Robinson,
2001). The various methods of payment to physicians represent a form of an
incentive contract which links the physician to a larger organization such as a
medical group, insurance company or other employer (hospital, etc.) (Robinson,
2001). There are three main categories of physician reimbursement, each setting
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up their own incentives for physician behavior (Robinson, 2001). The three main
categories are fee-for-service (retrospective), capitation (prospective) and salary
(Robinson, 2001). As previously indicated, Medicare reimburses for physician
services largely on a fee-for-service basis, as do many commercial payers.
However, as the healthcare system has evolved, various forms of blended
reimbursement and compensation methodologies have developed, but fee-forservice has remained a dominant method (Robinson, 2001).
The structure of physician reimbursement and compensation is complex
and the failures of the available core methodologies have led to increasing hybrid
based methodologies such as those that attempt to reward quality in terms of
outcomes and patient experience or satisfaction. The focus is around the
structure of payment which links compensation with measures of performance
(Robinson, 2001) with the ultimate goal of changing physician behavior to
improve overall healthcare value. According to Robinson (2001, p. 155-156)
there are four distinctive physician behaviors that revised payment
methodologies attempt to persuade:


Physician Productivity and Patient Service: Healthcare is ultimately
a service industry, which promotes physicians being productive in
order to provide the service and to be attentive to the needs and
desires of individual patients. Fee-for-service best incentivizes
these behaviors.
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Risk Acceptance: Physicians should accept and care for the sickest
patients just as they do the well patients. They should not be
encouraged to avoid the chronically ill, time intensive patients. Feefor-service also performs well in incenting these behaviors.



Efficiency and Appropriate Scope of Practice: Physicians should be
encouraged to consider cost-benefit and balance their
recommendations considering the most appropriate service in the
most appropriate location dependent on patient needs. Efficiency
measures would not support over or under utilization. Fee-for
service and capitation each have their strengths and weaknesses in
this regard, fee-for-service encouraging supplier-induced demand
and capitation promoting the right care at the right time and
location, but also encouraging under-utilization.



Cooperation, Evidence-Based Medicine and Outcomes: The US
Healthcare system is fragmented, lacks communication and
integration. Physicians should be encouraged to collaborate,
coordinate care and focus on evidence-based medicine to promote
optimal clinical outcomes. Fee-for-service does not compensate for
these types of activities, thus making it counterproductive, and
capitation offers some potential for focusing on “epidemiological
patterns of illness” and resource conservation, but falls short of
encouraging physician collaboration and integration.
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Research on the implications of reimbursing physicians based on quality
metrics is a newer concept and is much more limited. Flodgren, et al (2011)
found that financial incentives were ineffective in improving compliance with
guidelines and that “target payments and bonuses” did not improve compliance
with guidelines (Flodgren, 2011). Scott, et al (2011) showed that evidence on the
use of financial incentives as it related to improvements in the quality of primary
care was inconclusive (Scott, 2011). Still others have shown that results are
mixed, specifically that with regard to impact of pay for performance on clinical
effectiveness, there is a range from negative or no effect to positive effect,
dependent on the measure and program (Van Herck, 2010). Christianson (2007)
also showed mixed results with limited evidence to support financial incentives
targeted at improving quality but a few significant impacts were reported
(Christianson, 2007). Others in the field of behavioral economics have shown
that financial rewards can undermine motivation and have a detrimental impact
on performance when the task is cognitively complex, ultimately suggesting that
pay-for-performance programs may have an unintended negative consequence
(Himmelstein, 2014). Li, et al (2014) found a moderate response to financial
incentives and that physicians responded to financial incentives for certain
services (such as pap smears, mammograms, colorectal cancer screening and
senior flu shots) but not for others (toddler immunizations) and recommended
that financial incentives designed to improve quality performance proceed with
caution (Li, 2014).
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2.2

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
In addition to the financial incentives and penalties that are hoped to

change physician behavior in order to drive changes in healthcare delivery, CMS
and many commercial payers have instituted transparency of the available
pricing and performance information. Specifically, CMS has implemented its
Hospital Compare (http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html) and
Physician Compare (http://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/search.html)
websites, which allows consumers (patients) to view information on certain
quality and cost measures across providers. Figure 2 shows an example of a
clinical measure and patient satisfaction result for a selected Medicare ACO from
the physician compare website. Reporting requirements, and thus data
availability, differ depending on whether or not a physician participates in a
Medicare ACO, but information on the MU program and PQRS participation is
generally available via the Physician Compare website for all physicians.
Figure 2
(The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015)

Quality Measure

Performance Rate

Hemoglobin A1c Control (HbAlc) (< 8 percent)
Percentage of patients ages 18 to 75 years of age
with diabetes mellitus who had HbA1c < 8.0
percent.
Patients' Rating of Doctor
Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst
provider possible and 10 is the best provider
possible, what number would you use to rate this
provider?

60%

94%
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Transparency of information related to price and quality is extremely
important in order for the market to function properly. In microeconomics, it is
typically assumed that there is perfect information in the market being assessed.
By perfect information, economists mean that the consumers and producers of a
product or service each have complete information on the price and quality of the
goods or services under consideration; or that consumers are as well informed
about the product or service as the seller (Folland, 2006). Healthcare clearly
suffers from a lack of perfect information in that information on price and quality
are often unavailable, and that information is often asymmetric. There are many
issues related to asymmetric information in the healthcare market, such as
adverse selection and agency problems. For purposes of this section, the focus
will be on agency related to asymmetric information, specifically those situations
where there is asymmetric information between physicians and patients leading
to an agency problem.
As initially explained by Arrow (1963, p. 951) “Uncertainty as to the quality
of the product is perhaps more intense here than in any other important
commodity…because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information
possessed by the physician as to the consequences and possibilities of
treatment is necessarily very much greater than that of the patient, or at least so
it is believed by both parties. Further, both parties are aware of this informational
inequality and their relation is colored by this knowledge.” For example,
oftentimes in the physician-patient relationship the patient has significantly less
information than the physician with regard to their condition, treatment, risk and
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benefits of treatments, the cost of treatment and the quality of the provider
offering the treatment (Folland, 2006). If a patient seeks the services of a
physician for a sore throat, they trust the physician to choose the right course of
treatment based on the physician’s knowledge of whether the sore throat is
caused by a virus or bacteria and other patient specific factors. The patient does
not have the information to determine whether or not the physician chose the
best course of treatment. This leads to the agency relationship.
By definition, an agency relationship is a relationship “formed whenever a
principal (for example, a patient) delegates decision-making authority to another
party, the agent. In the physician-patient relationship, the patient (principal)
delegates authority to the physician (agent), who in many cases also will be the
provider of the recommended services. The motive behind this delegation of
authority is that the principals recognize that they are relatively uninformed about
the most appropriate decisions to be made and that the deficiency is best
resolved by having an informed agent” (Folland, 2006) p. 207. Given this
scenario, we would expect a perfect agent to make medical decisions as the
patient would make decisions for themselves if they had the same information
that the physician has (Folland, 2006). Under this principal-agent structure, the
role of the agent (physician) is to maximize the utility of the principal (patient)
within available resources (Vick, Agency in Health Care: Examining Patients'
Preferences for Attributes of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1998). Thus,
physicians must include the utility of their patients’ desire for quality healthcare
into their profit maximizing objective function (McGuire T. , 2000). There
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becomes the possibility that these two objectives in a physician’s behavioral
model (the patients’ utility derived from quality healthcare and the physician’s
utility derived from profit maximization) may be in conflict depending on
incentives and payment system structures within the market (Dwyer, 2012).
Thus, clarity of the efficiency of final outcomes is often clouded (Dwyer, 2012).
The information asymmetry and principal-agent problem between physicians and
patients has been recognized as one of the fundamental market failures in
healthcare (Smith, 2005), in the words of Arrow (1963), specifically “a failure to
reach an optimal state in the sense of Pareto” (947).
Medical care is essentially a market for information, that is, patients are
seeking information and advice from physicians that they cannot ascertain on
their own (Haas-Wilson, 2001). However, once the information is delivered, there
are also questions to be answered about appropriate clinical interventions
(Smith, 2005). Pauly (1978) developed a classification system of physician
services and explained there are “diagnostic”, “prescriptive-informative” and
“active-therapeutic” services. Further, he explained “administration of an
injection, surgical procedure or a normal delivery” are examples of activetherapeutic care, which is more of a skill than exchange of information (Pauly,
1978). The physician’s knowledge and information is, however, necessary as a
precursor to any therapeutic treatment. Markets for information have been
extensively researched by economists and it is generally recognized that these
markets have specific peculiarities that lead to inefficiencies and failures in the
market (Haas-Wilson, 2001). These market failures include the fact that “sellers
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of information often have difficulty capturing the returns on the information they
provide”, “buyers of information rarely know the value of the information until after
it is purchased and sometimes never at all” and “buyers of a product often have
less information about the product’s value (price and/or quality) than do its
sellers” (Haas-Wilson, 2001) (p.1034). The market failure related to sellers
having difficulty capturing returns on information is diminished by the patient
specificity of the information, but the issue of lack of quality information prior to
purchase is very pronounced in the market for healthcare services (Haas-Wilson,
2001).
It has been shown in the economics literature that in markets where
quality information is unavailable prior to purchase, quality is reduced to the
lowest level in the market (Akerlof, 1970). Further, (Leland, 1979) showed that
quality is reduced to the lowest level in those markets where price is available
without cost to the consumer, quality information is unavailable and price and
quality are unrelated. Fortunately, this race to the bottom in terms of quality in the
market for physician services has not occurred (Haas-Wilson, 2001). This is
predominantly because in the market for physician services (as opposed to used
cars in the Akerlof model), quality is somewhat endogenous because physician
have some control over the quality of the service they are providing (HaasWilson, 2001). Further, unlike the Akerlof model where consumers were unable
to obtain any information on quality prior to purchase, patients are able to obtain
at least limited information on quality through word of mouth, past experiences,
physician signaling (Haas-Wilson, 2001), or the increasingly prevalent quality
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information made available over the internet. Even before the increasing
availability of quality information and scorecards, Arrow recognized that a
consumer or patient may not be able to observe whether or not “the physician is
using his knowledge to the best advantage” (Arrow, 1963, p. 965) but the
consumer can get at least some information about quality before making a
purchasing decision through different signals provided by the physician or other
sources (Haas-Wilson, 2001). For example, consumers could assume that
physicians who work the longest hours, or physicians that it takes longer to gain
an appointment with are of higher quality because they have more patients
(Haas-Wilson, 2001). Thus work hours or appointment availability could be a
signal of quality (Haas-Wilson, 2001). However, the “rat race” dynamic erodes
the accuracy of these signals when lower quality physicians recognize that
worked hours or appointment availability serve as a signal of quality and they
adjust their hours or appointment availability accordingly (Haas-Wilson, 2001).
Even with access to at least limited information on quality, it is still possible for
quality to diminish (Haas-Wilson, 2001). If high prices are used as a signal of
high quality, “dishonest firms” could sell lower quality products at higher than
market prices (Cooper, 1984). This phenomena has also been demonstrated by
(Chen, 1982) where it was shown that when asymmetric information occurs,
even if price and quality information are available, consumers could still be
charged higher prices for low quality services (Haas-Wilson, 2001). The key to an
efficient market is the availability of reliable data on price and quality. As shown
by Klein and Leffler (1981), profit maximizing firms are not likely to cheat with
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regard to delivery of high quality services so long as prices are sufficiently above
costs (Klein, 1981). Thus, by making information on quality more readily
available, it is the goal of healthcare reform policies that more informed
consumers will be able to make better decisions as to their choice of healthcare
providers, meaning they will select the provider with the lowest quality-adjusted
prices (Haas-Wilson, 2001). Another positive outcome of increased transparency
of price and quality information is that physicians and other providers will
decrease their quality-adjusted prices either by decreasing prices or improving
quality (Haas-Wilson, 2001).

2.3

LINK BETWEEN PATIENT SATISFACTION AND CLINICAL

QUALITY
Patient satisfaction and patient preferences with their physicians have
been extensively studied in the available research from many different aspects.
For example, Godager (2012) showed that overall, patients prefer physicians that
are similar to themselves in observable characteristics (Godager, 2012). Vick and
Scott (1998) showed that the most important attribute to patients was the ability
to talk to their doctor, and choosing their own treatment was the least important
element (Vick, 1998). Still others have assessed patient’s abilities to ascertain
technical quality of care and found that “patients’ assessments are not a
sufficient basis for assessing the technical quality of their primary care” (Rao,
2006) p. 1.
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Studies on the relationship between patient satisfaction and physician
quality performance are limited, primarily because much of the data is relatively
new in the provider realm; and there is a lack of consistent methodology for
assessing quality. In support of linking physician payment to patient satisfaction
data, studies have shown a relationship between patient perceptions of their
physician and overall outcomes such as adherence, satisfaction, trust, health
status change and symptom resolution (Franks, 2006). Zolnierek (2009) showed
the link between patient satisfaction and improved adherence to physician
recommendations (Zolnierek, 2009). On the other hand, researches have shown
that patients often request elective services that offer limited benefit based on
marketing or other non-medically evident motives; and physicians often honor
such requests to improve patient satisfaction (Kravitz, 2005). And, research has
shown that in cases where physicians’ compensation is more heavily tied to
patient satisfaction, physicians are more likely to order elective testing such as
advanced imaging services for back pain (Pham, 2009).
Still others have challenged whether or not patients are able to ascertain
technical quality, questioning whether emphasizing patient satisfaction is
detrimental to clinical treatment decisions. Lembke (2013) explains, “In some
institutions, patient-survey ratings can affect physicians’ reimbursement and job
security. When I asked a physician colleague who regularly treats pain how he
deals with the problem of using opioids in patients who he knows are abusing
them, he said, “Sometimes I just have to do the right thing and refuse to
prescribe them, even if I know they’re going to go on Yelp and give me a bad
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rating.” His “sometimes” seems to imply that at other times he knowingly
prescribes opioids to abusers because not doing so would adversely affect his
professional standing. If that’s the case, he is by no means alone” (Lembke,
2013) p. 36.
One of the most significant recent studies showed that among those
patients with the highest patient satisfaction scores, there was a lower odds of
visiting the emergency department, a higher odds of inpatient admission,
increased total expenditures (relative to less satisfied patients), increased
prescription drug expenditures and higher overall mortality (Fenton, 2012). The
study by Fenton, et al (2012) assessed the relationship between patient
satisfaction and healthcare utilization, expenditures and outcomes as opposed to
quality in terms of defined metrics such as HEDIS. Using the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (“MEPS”), mortality follow-up data and results of the
Consumer Assessment of Heath Plans Survey, Fenton, et al (2012) conducted a
prospective cohort study in which they estimated the association between patient
satisfaction and healthcare utilization based on emergency department visits and
inpatient admissions, healthcare expenditures in total and for just prescription
drugs and mortality during a period of 3.9 years of follow-up. Fenton, et al (2012)
adjusted for patient demographics such as age, sex, race/ethnicity, census
region, household income and education level among others. They also
considered insurance status of the patient, chronic disease burden, overall health
status and availability of a usual source of care. Patient satisfaction results were
divided into four quartiles. While the Fenton, et al (2012) study did not have
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quality metrics available, it did show that patients in the highest patient
satisfaction quartile were less likely to have an emergency room visit, which is a
positive effect of patient satisfaction but of concern was that Fenton, et al (2012)
also found that more satisfied patients are more likely to have an inpatient
admission, have higher total health and prescription drug spending and have an
increased risk of mortality.
Similar to the Fenton, et al (2012) study, Sacks, et al (2015) assessed
hospital patient satisfaction as it relates to outcomes, however, their study was
focused on surgical outcomes (Sacks, 2015). Specifically, they used the
American College of Surgeons National Surgical Quality Improvement Project
(“ACS NQIP”) data along with Medicare inpatient claims, the American Hospital
Association annual survey and patient satisfaction results retrieved from Hospital
Compare to assess post-operative mortality, major complications, minor
complications, failure to rescue and readmissions relationship with patient
satisfaction. Sacks, et al (2015) used a global patient satisfaction composite for
their dependent variable, aggregating the results from the HCAHPS questions
“the number of patients reporting that they would recommend the hospital to
family or friends” and “the number of patients giving the hospital a global rating of
9 or 10 out of 10” and assigning hospitals too quartiles based on satisfaction
scores (Sacks, 2015 p.E3). The authors did find a statistically significant
relationship between patient satisfaction quartile and 30 day mortality as well as
failure to rescue and minor complications. Specifically, patients treated at the
highest quartile hospitals for patient satisfaction had a 15% lower odds of death
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within 30 days, an 18% lower odds of failure to rescue and a 13% lower odds of
minor complications (Sacks, 2015). However, the relationships were not always
linear. For the findings related to mortality and failure to rescue, “the lowest riskadjusted rates were noted in the second highest quartile, with slightly higher
rates (although not statistically significantly higher) in the highest quartile (Sacks,
2015) p. E5. The study did not show a statistically significant relationship
between patient satisfaction and major complications or patient satisfaction and
readmissions (Sacks, 2015). The authors concluded that “patient satisfaction
may fall into a different domain of heath care quality from other surgical quality
metrics” (Sacks, 2015) p. E5.
Other studies have looked more directly at the relationship between
patient satisfaction results and clinical technical quality. For example, (Farley,
2014) found that “current evidence demonstrates that patient satisfaction is not a
validated proxy for quality” (p. 354). Farley, et al (2014) conducted a literature
review to assess the relationship between patient satisfaction and clinical quality.
Studies assessed included hospital quality, nursing quality and physician quality
among others, for a total of 26 studies reviewed. They ultimately recommended
that patient satisfaction not be misinterpreted as a measure of clinical quality
(Farley, 2014). (Manary, 2013) also reviewed the available literature to determine
whether or not patients’ reports of their satisfaction with healthcare services are
reflective of the quality of care. Their findings showed lack of consensus on the
relationship between patient satisfaction and clinical quality, but they ultimately
concluded that the evidence is suggestive of patient experience measures being
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“robust, distinctive indicators of health care quality” (p. 203). However, their focus
did not include specific measures of technical quality and identified items such as
adherence, overall outcomes and physician-patient communication (Manary,
2013). Additionally, they cited the flaws in using health plan data in some of the
previous studies, and point to the challenges with timeliness of surveys provided
by health plans or primary care physicians that often conduct surveys on an
annual basis as reasoning for the findings that show lack of correlation (Manary,
2013).
(Chang, 2006) used a global rating of patient experience derived from the
CAHPS survey to assess the relationship with quality as measured by the
Assessing Care of Vulnerable Elders (“ACVE”) including 207 quality indicators.
They found that better communication was associated with improved patient
satisfaction, but that technical quality of care did not show statistically significant
association with patient satisfaction global ratings (Chang, 2006). They
recommended that “vulnerable elders’ global ratings of care not be used as a
marker of technical quality of care” (p. 665). (Gandhi, 2002) attempted to create a
report card for the ambulatory environment since the concept was prevalent with
hospitals and health plans, but not with ambulatory clinics. In doing so, they used
HEDIS-like measures such as “clinic function, patient satisfaction, diabetes
guideline compliance and asthma guideline compliance” (Gandhi, et al 2002). As
part of that process, they assessed the relationship between each of the five
domains and found no significant correlation between any of the domains
(Gandhi, et al, 2002). Still others have found a relationship between patient
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satisfaction and outcomes but noted that “more goes into satisfaction than just
outcomes” (Kane, 1997) p. 714. However, their study was limited to surgical
patients undergoing a cholecystectomy. Of note, is that this study relied on
patient interviews before surgery and at 6 months post-surgery, focusing on
health status at the baseline interview and satisfaction as well as health
outcomes at the follow-up interview (Kane, 1997).
Another study that focused on surgical quality and hospital care showed
that hospitals with higher patient satisfaction scores were those hospitals that
provided more efficient care and had higher surgical quality (Tsai, 2015). For
their study, they used the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (“HCAHPS”) survey combined with Medicare data on 6
common surgical procedures to measure efficiency and quality, including items
such as length of stay, mortality rate and readmission rate (Tsai, 2015). Another
study, though not based in the United States, showed an inverse relationship
between quality of care and patient satisfaction (Hutchison, 2003). While their
study focused on the ambulatory environment, quality was measured by quality
of care criteria created by an expert review panel for 8 common acute conditions
and responses to satisfaction questionnaires that focused on communication, the
physician’s attitude and wait-time (Hutchison, 2003). And, others have reviewed
the literature and determined that “research leaves open if patient experiences
with received care can serve as a valid quality indicator which should be utilized
for reimbursement purposes (Schoenfelder, 2012).
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As of the time of this writing, there are two (2) known studies that assess
patient satisfaction results as it relates to quality metrics using patient satisfaction
survey and HEDIS (quality) results in an ambulatory environment. However, each
of these studies uses health plan data for the analysis.


Schneider, et al (2001) assessed the relationship between health plan
enrollee responses to the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey
2.0 and clinical quality using a national sample of 233 Medicare health
plans’ HEDIS results from 1998. Thus, this study assessed patient
satisfaction with their care as it relates to the health plan versus a provider
specific survey. Schneider, et al (2001) used five composite measures and
four ratings from the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey; and
six HEDIS measures for their assessment. Specifically, they grouped the
Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey results into reporting
composites based on the domain that the response most closely
represented. The five composites ultimately included: “getting needed
care”, “getting care quickly”, “health plan information and customer
service”, “courtesy and respect of doctor’s office staff” and
“communication with providers” (Schneider, et al, 2001) p. 1325. And,
elements assessing the doctor-patient relationship as well as enrollees’
average ambulatory use were included (Schneider, et al, 2001). The
HEDIS health plan performance rates from 1998 included in the study
were: the proportion of eligibly women that had their mammogram, the
proportion of diabetic patients that had their recommended annual eye
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exam, the proportion of patients that had a myocardial infarction (heart
attack) that were treated with a beta blocker, the proportion of patients that
had a cardiovascular event such as myocardial infarction or cardiac
revascularization that had a serum low density lipoprotein (“LDL”) test
done, the proportion of patient admitted to the hospital for a mental health
condition that had follow-up within 30 days of hospitalization, the
proportion of patients diagnosed with a mental health condition that had
effective continuation of antidepressant medications (Schneider, et al
2001). The study was performed using heath plan data and perspective,
thus its approach differs from this research. Linear regression was used to
assess the relationship between specific Consumer Assessment of Health
Plans Survey composites and specific HEDIS measure results as opposed
to an overall rating of patient satisfaction and quality. The researchers did
identify a pattern of associations in the measures that they interpreted as
suggestive of the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey (patient
satisfaction) and HEDIS (quality) measures being complementary in that
two of the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey composites were
consistently associated with most HEDIS measures, those being
“enrollees’ experience with obtaining needed care” and “enrollees’
experience obtaining information and customer service from their health
plan” (Schneider, 2001). However, they also found that the Consumer
Assessment of Health Plans Survey global rating as measured by the
average score of health plans was not significantly associated with HEDIS

36

results, showing that patients’ overall satisfaction with their care and their
health plan were not associated with the health plan’s performance on
HEDIS results.


Sequist, et al (2008) assessed the association between clinical quality
using HEDIS measures and patient experience using the Ambulatory Care
Experiences Survey (“ACES”) using data from 373 practice sites and 119
individual primary care physicians in the state of Massachusetts. The
authors created three composites from the HEDIS results, two that
addressed processes of care (preventive measures and disease
management) and one that addressed outcomes (Sequist, et al, 2008).
Seven composites from the ACES results were created that included
“doctor-patient communication”, “clinical team interactions”, “health
promotion and support”, “integration of care”, “office staff”, “visit-based
continuity” and “organizational access” (Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1787).
Their analysis was based on Spearman correlation coefficients where they
calculated Spearman correlation coefficients between the HEDIS quality
composites and the ACES patient satisfaction composites. Much like
Schneider, et al (2001), the data used was obtained from health plan
reported information as opposed to provider specific. Data collected in this
manner are primarily claims based in nature and/or include some
component of medical record review by the health plan (Sequist, et al,
2008). However, Sequist, et al (2008) were able to calculate the HEDIS
scores to the individual physician level using the available data. While
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Sequist, et al (2008) used a different patient satisfaction survey tool
(ACES) than Schneider, et al (2001), they were similar in that they were
both health plan administered. The authors showed an “absence of
overwhelmingly strong correlations” (Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1788) between
patient satisfaction results and clinical quality metrics and deduced that
clinical quality and patient satisfaction “represent sufficiently distinct
activities” (Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1788). And further, they stated “patients
using such data to select a primary care physician may need to make
trade-offs between technical performance and interpersonal performance”
(Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1788).
Each of these studies ultimately found that satisfaction has limited if any
correlation with quality as measured by HEDIS metrics, the most commonly used
quality metrics in an ambulatory environment (Fenton, 2012). Overall, data and
evidence of the relationship between patient satisfaction results and individual
physician performance on quality measures remains ill-defined. Additionally, the
only available research has been conducted using health plan data as opposed
to provider data. This research extends the currently available research by
studying the correlation between patient satisfaction and clinical quality using a
physician organization’s quality data set and patient satisfaction results as well
as using a more robust set of metrics and physician characteristics and
demographics. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use physician
organization data in this manner, primarily because of the relative infancy of
quality programs within provider organizations.
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3.

METHODOLOGY

3.1

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data will be obtained from a regional physician hospital organization (“PHO”)
in northeast Ohio. In 2011, the PHO implemented an integrated EHR across all
of its physician practices; and in 2012 it designed and implemented a physician
performance bonus program in efforts to begin linking physician reimbursement
to quality and patient satisfaction metrics. The PHO consists of approximately
120 physicians across various specialties, with a strong primary care base. For
purposes of this study, the PHO’s clinical quality database from calendar year
2013 will be utilized and linked with its patient satisfaction database and
physician demographics. The clinical quality metrics database includes 27
HEDIS measures that were included in the performance bonus program for
calendar year 2013. Patient Satisfaction results include patient responses to the
Clinician and Groups (“CG”)-CAHPS survey (attached as Exhibit 1) received
during the calendar year, 2013 for the PHO physicians. Because the majority of
the HEDIS measures included in the PHO’s performance bonus program apply
exclusively to primary care physicians, the study was limited to family medicine,
internal medicine, pediatric and gynecology physicians.
This study’s focus is patient satisfaction as expressed by patient ranking of
their physician on a scale of 1-10, 10 being the highest and its connection to
physician performance on quality metrics as measured by individual physician
performance on HEDIS measures as determined by documentation in the EHR.
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Previous studies have mostly used claims based data. Patient identifiable
information is not provided. Every patient satisfaction response received during
calendar year 2013 was included so long as there was corresponding quality
performance data for the designated physician. Thus, individual patients may be
represented more than one time if they had multiple physician visits within the
time period and responded to the patient satisfaction survey more than once. In
administration of the patient satisfaction survey, the PHO issued a survey to
every patient with an email address on file each time they had an office visit at
one of the participating practices. For those patients without an email address on
file, a monthly random selection of patients was identified to receive a hard-copy,
mailed survey. The results of the electronic surveys and paper surveys were
combined by scanning the paper surveys through a character recognition
program and including them in the electronic database. Due to the nature of the
survey process, those patients that visit the doctor more frequently or see more
doctors within the PHO network would have more opportunities to respond to a
survey and may be represented in the data more than once. Further, patients
that responded more than once may have different results for each response.
During the time period, the response rate to the survey was 12%. Though this
may be considered a low response rate for surveys in general, relative to patient
satisfaction in healthcare, it is slightly above the average of 11% (Scaletta, 2015).
Further, a limitation of this data is the fact that the data is limited to physicians
affiliated with one organization in northeast Ohio.
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3.2

DATA SOURCES

Data from the PHO’s patient satisfaction database include patient level
responses to the CG-CAHPS 6 point questionnaire during calendar year 2013 by
physician with corresponding patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, city of residence
and insurance status expressed as Commercial, Medicare, Medicaid or self-pay.
City of residence will be used to supplement the database with median
household income by city of residence. The database contains 4,617 responses
for the time period, of which 3,017 are for PCPs. The overall physician rating is
the focus of this research and is reflected by the score on the following question
from the CG-CAHPS survey: “Using any number from 1 to 10, where 1 is the
worst doctor possible and 10 is the best doctor possible, what number would you
use to rate this doctor?”
This data will be paired with the PHO’s clinical quality metric database
which includes physician performance on designated HEDIS measures. The data
is not matched to the patient level, i.e. it cannot be determined whether an
individual physician met a certain quality measure for a specific patient that
responded to the patient satisfaction results. Thus, the individual physician is the
data element that links the patient satisfaction and quality measures. The total
physician quality measure score is included for each patient satisfaction
response for that physician and performance for each individual quality metric
are also available. For the 2013 performance year, there were 27 clinical
measures applicable to the PCPs in the PHO. However, not every measure is
applicable to every type of PCP. For purposes of this study, PCP is defined as a
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physician in the data set with the specialty of Internal Medicine, Family Medicine,
Pediatrics or Gynecology. Specialists were excluded due to the scarcity of clinical
quality metrics applicable to them. For purposes of exclusions, specialists were
defined as any physician with a primary specialty other than Internal Medicine,
Family Medicine, Pediatrics or Gynecology.
Table 1 reflects the measures and the thresholds that physicians were
required to meet as part of the performance bonus program. The measures were
selected based on the PHO’s contracts with the three major payers in their
market. These measures represent the HEDIS measures that are incorporated
into the PHO’s payer contracts as quality metrics that they are accountable for
under the terms of their pay for performance program. The threshold is payer
stipulated based on HEDIS methodologies which includes a regional adjustment
(The National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2015). As part of their NCQA
accreditation, health plans/payers are required to submit data on their provider
network’s performance on certain HEDIS measures. Thus, NCQA has a
benchmark and threshold system for rating health plan performance. According
to NCQA “As described in the Standards and Guidelines for the Accreditation of
Health Plans, NCQA requires organizations to submit specified HEDIS measures
and CAHPS 5.0H survey results annually. NCQA determines the HEDIS
measure portion of the score by comparing organization results with a national
benchmark (the 90th percentile of national results) and with regional and national
thresholds (the 75th, 50th and 25th percentiles). NCQA uses the higher of two
scores: the result based on comparison with the average of the regional and
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national thresholds, or the result based on comparison with national thresholds”.
For example,
Figure 3 represents the NCQA scoring for cervical cancer screening. The payer
defined benchmark for this measure for the PHO was 76%, which is above the
50th percentile for the PHO’s region (5) and is at the 50th percentile for national
(The National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2015). The 90th percentile at the
regional level is not reported by NCQA.

Figure 3
Source: NCQA, 2015

Table 1
HEDIS Clinical Quality Metrics
Measure
Blood Pressure
(“BP”)
Measurement

Population
All members
> 18

Requirement
Document BP

Frequency
Annually

Threshold
63.00%

Specialty
All

Tobacco Use
Status

All members
13+

Annually

76.00%

All

Childhood
Immunizations
– Measles,
Mumps,
Rubella

Patients
turning 2 in
measureme
nt period

Document
tobacco use
status
MMR
immunization

On or before
2nd birthday

61.63%

Pediatrics
(“Peds”),
Family
Practice
(“FP”)
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(“MMR”)

Childhood
Immunizations
- Varicella
Well Child
Visits

Patients
turning 2 in
measureme
nt period
All members
0-18

VZV
immunization

On or before
2nd birthday

61.63%

Peds, FP

Age 0-1: At
least 5 visits,
age 2-18: At
least 1 visit
Children 2–18
years of age
diagnosed with
pharyngitis and
dispensed an
antibiotic must
have a test for
group A
streptococcus
for the episode

Annually

61.63%

Peds, FP

Strep test
administere
d in the 7day period

63.64%

Peds, FP

Appropriate
Testing for
Children with
Pharyngitis

Patients 218 years of
age with a
diagnosis of
only
pharyngitis
(ICD 462)

Annual
Preventive Visit

All members
> 18

Annual
preventive visit

Annually

50.00%

Internal
Medicine
(“IM”), FP

Breast Cancer
Screening

Females 4069

Bi-annually

74.00%

IM, FP,
Gynecolo
gy
(“GYN”)

Colorectal
Cancer
Screening

Patients 5080

Varies

58.00%

IM, FP

Cervical
Cancer
Screening

Females 2164

Patient had
mammogram
during year or
within the past
year
Fecal occult
blood
([“FOBT”],
gFOBT, or
iFOBT) test in
current year, or
flexible
sigmoidoscopy
in the past 5
years, or
double contrast
barium enema
within the past
5 years, or
colonoscopy in
the past 10
years
Pap smear
performed

Every 36
months

76.00%

IM, FP,
GYN
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Appropriate
Antibiotic use
with Acute
Bronchitis

Diabetes Care HbA1C

Patients 1864 who had
an
outpatient
visit with
any
diagnosis of
acute
bronchitis
(ICD 466)
All diabetic
members

Diabetes Care LDL - C

All diabetic
members

Diabetes Care Nephropathy
Screening

All diabetic
members

Diabetes Care Eye Exam

All diabetic
members

Lipid Screening
- Cardiac
Conditions

Patients
with
ischemic
vascular
disease or
discharged
alive with
PCI, CABG,
AMI
Patients
who are
treated with
Anticonvuls
ants during
the
measureme
nt year

Annual
Monitoring of
Persistent
Medications:
Anticonvulsants

Annual
Monitoring of
Persistent
Medications:
Digoxin

Patients
who are
treated with
Digoxin
during the
measureme
nt year

Patients should
not be
dispensed a
prescription for
antibiotic
medication on
or within 3 days
after the Index
Episode start
date
HbA1C testing
on all diabetic
patients
LDL-C testing
on all diabetic
patients
Nephropathy
screening, visit
w/nephrologist,
ACEI/ARB

Within 3
days of
episode

63.64%

IM, FP

Annually

90.00%

IM, FP

Annually

84.00%

IM, FP

Annually

85.00%

IM, FP

Comprehensive
eye exam in
measurement
year or a
negative retinal
exam in prior
year
LDL-C testing
on all patients

Annually

67.86%

IM, FP

Annually

63.64%

IM, FP

Patients have
at least 1
serum drug
measurement
(for the
prescribed
drug) during
the
measurement
year
Patients have
at least one
serum
potassium and
either a serum
creatinine or a
BUN test
during the
measurement

Annually

75.00%

IM, FP

Annually

75.00%

IM, FP
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year

Annual
Monitoring of
Persistent
Medications:
Diuretics

Patients
who are
treated with
diuretics
during the
measureme
nt year

Appropriate
Asthma
Medicines

Patients
with
persistent
asthma.
Excludes
members
with any
history of
emphysema
, chronic
obstructive
pulmonary
disease,
cystic
fibrosis, and
acute
respiratory
failure.
Patients
hospitalized
and
discharged
with an AMI
who do not
have a
contraindica
tion to beta
blockers
Patients 18
years or
older who
have been
diagnosed
with heart
failure any
time in the
past

Beta Blocker
after Acute
Myocardial
Infarction
(“AMI”)

Beta Blocker
for Heart
Failure

Patients have
at least one
serum
potassium and
either a serum
creatinine or a
BUN test
during the
measurement
year
Patients have
at least 1 claim
for an asthma
controller
medication

Annually

75.00%

IM, FP

Annually

63.64%

IM, FP,
Peds

Patients need
prescription for
beta blocker for
at least 6
months post
discharge

Continually
for 6 month
period

63.64%

IM, FP

Patients need
prescription for
beta blocker

Continually

63.64%

IM, FP
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Osteoporosis
Management

Females
67+ who
suffered a
fracture

Glaucoma
Screening

Patients age
67 years old
older who
do not have
a diagnosis
of glaucoma
or glaucoma
suspect
anytime in
the past
Patients
with newly
diagnosed
depressions
who started
an
antidepress
ant

New Episode of
Depression Acute Phase
Treatment

Generic
Dispensing
Rate

All members

High-Risk
Medications in
the Elderly

Patients age
65 and older

Treatment for
Children with
Upper
Respiratory
Infection
(“URI”)

Children
ages 3
months to
18 years
who were
assessed
with URI

Perform bone
mineral density
or prescribe Rx
for
osteoporosis
within 12
months before
or 6 months
after a fracture
Patients need
glaucoma
screening from
an optometrist
or
ophthalmologist

12 months
before - 6
months after
a fracture

63.64%

IM, FP,
Gyn

Every 2
years

70.00%

IM, FP

Patients need
to remain on
antidepressant
therapy for at
least 84 days in
the 114-day
period following
start of
antidepressant
Prescribe
medications
that come in
generic form or
document
medical
necessity of
brand
medication
Avoid certain
drugs with a
high-risk of side
effects, when
there may be
safer drug
choices
Patients should
not be
dispensed a
prescription for
antibiotic
medication on
or within three
days after the
Index Episode
start date

Annually

63.64%

IM, FP

N/A

84.00%

All

Continually

< 7%

All

Within 3
days of
Episode

63.64%

IM, FP
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Physician demographic and productivity factors will be made available from
the PHO for linking with the patient satisfaction and clinical quality metrics data.
Based on the individual physician, the demographic information will be added to
the database. The physician demographic and productivity factors available
include: physician age, physician gender, physician race/ethnicity, physician
specialty, physician degree (MD/DO), physician medical school ranking,
physician board certification status, physician wRVUs for the calendar year 2013
and total visit volume by facility for calendar year 2013. Previous studies have
not included physician characteristics in their analysis.

3.3

STUDY SAMPLE

The study sample includes all responses to the PHO issued CG-CAHPS
survey that were received in calendar year 2013 where the physician of record
had clinical quality performance data available for calendar year 2013 and the
physicians’ specialty was one of the designated primary care physician
specialties. There are a total of 3016 observations, producing a power estimate
of 99.99%. This sample was chosen because of the number of observations and
extensive quality metrics.

3.4

MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
3.4.1 PRIMARY OUTCOME MEASURE

For each model, the primary outcome measure will be the patient rating of
physician score as provided on the CG-CAHPS survey. This response is
provided on a scale of 1-10, 1 being the worst physician and 10 being the best.
The CG-CAHPS survey is a tool created by the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (“AHRQ”). Its validity and reliability have been studied and it has
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been found that “The CG-CAHPS Adult Survey has acceptable psychometric
properties at the individual level and practice site level. The analyses suggest
that the survey items are measuring their intended concepts and yield reliable
information” (Dyer, 2012). Further, the global rating of the doctor variable has
been found to be positively and significantly correlated with the composites of the
CG-CAHPS survey (Dyer, 2012). The overall doctor rating question with a
scaling of 1-10 is an ordinal variable.
3.4.2 COVARIATES
Covariates will be selected from the available data and will be based on
those variables that are perceived to have an impact on patient satisfaction. The
primary variables of interest are P4P score (composite of all clinical quality
metrics), wRVU, which provides information on how busy the doctor is
individually and office visit volume which shows the size and volume of an
individual office location. Other covariates were included as controls, specifically
those around physician and patient characteristics and demographics. The data
set will be supplemented with the medical school ranking for each physician’s
medical school as provided by StartClass, which ranks medical schools based on
factors such as median Medical College Admissions Test score for admitted
students, median grade point average of admitted students, acceptance rate,
total enrollment and other factors. Additionally, the median household income of
the patients’ city of residence will be included using data from the US Census
bureau. The composite performance score on the clinical quality metrics was
used as a covariate in model 1 to measure the association between performance
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on clinical quality measures and patient satisfaction. The composite score for
quality metrics is the average of each individual physician’s performance on the
measures applicable to their specialty. In model 2, a composite score of the 3
antibiotic related measures will be added as shown in
Table 4 since antibiotic prescribing is often cited as one of the detrimental
effects of asymmetric information when physicians’ compensation is tied to
patient satisfaction. Table 2 reflects the covariates included in model 1 and Table
3 reflects the covariates included in model 2. Models 3-6 will mirror model 2 with
the exception of replacing the antibiotic composite with each of the other
composite measures as shown in Table 6.
Table 2
Model 1 Variables
Dependent Variable
Rating of
Physician Continuous
(1-10)

Patient Related Variables

Physician Related Variables

Age

Continuous

Age

Continuous

Gender

Categorical

Gender

Categorical

Race/Ethnicity

Categorical

Medical School
Ranking

Continuous

Insurance
Status

Categorical

Degree

Categorical

Median
Household
Income

Continuous

Board
Certification
Status

Categorical

Productivity
(wRVUs)
Office Visit
Volume
Composite Score
on Quality
Metrics

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
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Table 3
Model 2 Variables
Dependent Variable
Rating of
Physician
Continuous
(1-10)

Patient Related Variables

Physician Related Variables

Age

Continuous

Age

Continuous

Gender

Categorical

Gender

Categorical

Race/Ethnicity

Categorical

Medical School
Ranking

Continuous

Insurance
Status

Categorical

Degree

Categorical

Median
Household
Income

Continuous

Board
Certification
Status

Categorical

Productivity
(wRVUs)
Office Visit
Volume
Composite
Score of the 3
Antibiotic
Related
Measures

3.6

Continuous
Continuous

Continuous

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Cross-sectional regression analysis will be conducted using the data from

calendar year 2013 assessing the dependent variable (patient satisfaction
rating), patient and physician related variables as shown in Table 2 and Table 3
in order to test the null hypotheses. The dependent variable will be the response
to “Using any number from 1 to 10, where 1 is the worst doctor possible and 10 is
the best doctor possible, what number would you use to rate this doctor?” by
doctor from the CG-CAHPS survey. Predictor variables will be assessed by using
multiple linear regression models to measure effect. Multiple linear regression
model 1 will include the composite score (average of individual scores, equally
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weighted) for performance on clinical quality metrics as a predictor variable. This
composite score includes all measures applicable to each physician’s specialty.
Multiple linear regression model 2 will include the composite score
(average of individual scores, equally weighted) for performance on only the 3
clinical quality measures related to antibiotic prescribing as shown in Table 4.
Antibiotic prescribing practices are particularly relevant to this analysis because
of the issue of asymmetric information. Patients often go to their doctor seeking
antibiotics to feel better, but only the physician has the knowledge to determine
whether or not an antibiotic will be useful in the patient’s treatment plan. Since
antibiotics are used for bacterial infections and are not useful in viral infections,
the physician must first assess whether the patient has a viral or bacterial
infection. If the patient has a virus, an antibiotic is not needed, but there often
isn’t a solution for the patient other than to “wait it out” and rest. Patients are thus
more inclined to prefer an antibiotic as compared to no treatment, particularly
since they do not have the knowledge to know whether their condition is viral or
bacterial. One of the major criticisms of compensating physicians based on
patient satisfaction has to do with this very issue—physicians are incentivized to
increase patient satisfaction but the things that improve patient satisfaction, such
as receiving antibiotics to help their illness, may not be in their best interest.
Physicians are left in a quandary of whether to prescribe an antibiotic when it
may not be necessary, but keeps the patient happy versus upsetting the patient
and withholding the antibiotic, which is the correct thing to do clinically.
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Multiple linear regression models 3-6 will include one of each of the
remaining composite scores to assess the impact of each type of quality
measure. Specifically, composites will be created for vaccine adherence,
antibiotic usage, preventive services, chronic condition management and generic
prescribing as delineated in Table 5.
Table 4
Antibiotic Measures
Measure
Appropriate
Testing for
Children with
Pharyngitis

Population
Patients 2-18
years of age
with a diagnosis
of only
pharyngitis (ICD
462)

Appropriate
Antibiotic use
with Acute
Bronchitis

Patients 18-64
who had an
outpatient visit
with any
diagnosis of
acute bronchitis
(ICD 466)

Treatment for
Children with
Upper
Respiratory
Infection
(“URI”)

Children ages 3
months to 18
years who were
assessed with
URI

Requirement
Children 2–18
years of age
diagnosed with
pharyngitis and
dispensed an
antibiotic must
have a test for
group A
streptococcus
for the episode
Patients should
not be
dispensed a
prescription for
antibiotic
medication on
or within 3 days
after the Index
Episode start
date
Patients should
not be
dispensed a
prescription for
antibiotic
medication on
or within three
days after the
Index Episode
start date

Frequency
Strep test
administered in
the 7-day
period

Threshold
63.64%

Specialty
Peds, FP

Within 3 days
of episode

63.64%

IM, FP

Within 3 days
of Episode

63.64%

IM, FP
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Table 5
Composite Groups
Measure

Composite Group

Appropriate Testing for Children with Pharyngitis

Antibiotics

Appropriate Antibiotic use with Acute Bronchitis

Antibiotics

Treatment for Children with Upper Respiratory
Infection (“URI”)
Diabetes Care - HbA1C
Diabetes Care - LDL - C
Diabetes Care - Nephropathy Screening
Diabetes Care - Eye Exam
Lipid Screening - Cardiac Conditions
Annual Monitoring of Persistent Medications:
Anticonvulsants
Annual Monitoring of Persistent Medications: Digoxin
Annual Monitoring of Persistent Medications:
Diuretics
Appropriate Asthma Medicines
Beta Blocker after Acute Myocardial Infarction
(“AMI”)
Beta Blocker for Heart Failure
Generic Dispensing Rate
Blood Pressure (“BP”) Measurement
Tobacco Use Status
Well Child Visits
Annual Preventive Visit
Breast Cancer Screening
Colorectal Cancer Screening
Cervical Cancer Screening
Osteoporosis Management
Glaucoma Screening
Childhood Immunizations – Measles, Mumps,
Rubella (“MMR”)
Childhood Immunizations - Varicella

Antibiotics
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Chronic Condition
Generics
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive
Preventive

Vaccine
Vaccine

For this analysis, p-values less than .05 will be considered to be of
statistical significance.
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4.

RESULTS
We analyzed between 1849-2944 patient satisfaction observations,

depending on the model, along with PCP performance on HEDIS quality metrics
from calendar year 2013 for a regional PHO in northeast Ohio using Stata®
version 13.1. The mean overall patient satisfaction rating was 9.54 (scale 1-10)
and mean overall PCP quality score was 74.74%. There were 44 PCPs
represented in the data, 24 osteopathic and 20 allopathic; 15 females and 29
males. Ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression was used to determine
whether overall quality or certain quality composites were predictors of patient
satisfaction (“DoctorRating”). The mean patient satisfaction score was high and
had a very high frequency of ratings of either 9 or 10 (89.1% of respondents
rated their doctor using a “9” or “10”). Therefore, transformation of the
DoctorRating variable was attempted by grouping scores of 1-4 into one score
and retaining scores of 5-10. Using this grouped variable, the models were
attempted using ordered probit regression. However, there was not a significant
difference in the results between models and the r-squared values were higher
using OLS and the ungrouped DoctorRating variable. Thus OLS was used for all
models.
In all six models, our null hypothesis was that there is not a relationship
between patient satisfaction and the clinical performance metric being tested
versus the alternative that there is a relationship between patient satisfaction and
performance on the clinical quality metric being tested, though in models 1 and 4
our prediction was that the null hypothesis was true.
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4.1

MODEL ONE: OVERALL QUALITY COMPOSITE

We predicted that overall, patients would not be more satisfied with
physicians that performed better on clinical quality metrics due to issues of
information asymmetry; and that patient satisfaction and clinical quality are
distinct, unrelated domains, which represents the null hypothesis in this model
that there is no relationship between overall clinical quality and patient
satisfaction. Table 6 reflects the results of this model:
Table 6
OLS Results: Overall Quality Score Model- Hypothesis 1
Number of obs:
F(19, 2924):
Prob > F:
R-squared:
Root MSE

2944
3.80
0.0000
0.0310
1.0449
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As shown, we did not find a statistically significant relationship between
DoctorRating and clinical quality (“QualityScore”) with a p-value of .190 and
therefore fail to reject our null hypothesis that the two are unrelated, distinct
domains. Additionally, the r-squared value of .0310 shows that only 3.1% of the
variance in DoctorRating is predicted by the model. Multiple regression
diagnostics were performed and ultimately, the Breusch-Pagan and White’s tests
showed evidence of heteroscedasticity in model 1. Because heteroscedasticity
was detected in the model, HC3 robust standard errors were used. Control
variables that were shown to be significant predictors of patient satisfaction rating
include (p-values in parentheses) medical school ranking (.001), median
household income of the patient’s city (.009), patient race of Hispanic (.012) and
patient age (.000). All statistically significant variables had a positive association
with DoctorRating with the exception of median household income of the
patient’s city of residence, which is negatively associated with Doctor Rating,
meaning that those patients that reside in cities with lower household incomes
are more satisfied with their physician overall, after controlling for insurance
status, race, age, gender and other factors. However, the coefficient is near zero.
The statistically significant and positively correlated variables indicate that
patients are more satisfied with physicians that attended a higher ranked medical
school, Hispanic patients are more satisfied with their physicians as compared to
Caucasian patients and patients’ satisfaction with their physician increases as
patients age. Also, being an allopathic physician was not statistically significant at
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the .05 level (.051). However, it was statistically significant in other models,
indicating a potential relationship with patient satisfaction.

4.2

MODEL TWO: ANTIBIOTIC COMPOSITE
Our second model centered on the detrimental impacts of reimbursing

physicians for patient satisfaction. Critics cite prescribing antibiotics as one of the
major areas where there is asymmetric information, i.e. the patient desires to be
prescribed an antibiotic to cure their condition, but they don’t have the knowledge
to know whether or not an antibiotic is an effective treatment for their conditiononly the physician has this knowledge. And, oftentimes taking an antibiotic can
be detrimental to the patient’s health and to the general health of the public
(antibiotic resistant bacteria). Thus, the argument is that if physicians are
incentivized to improve patient satisfaction, they may inappropriately prescribe
antibiotics in order to keep patients happy, even though there are negative health
consequences. Because there were three HEDIS measures related to antibiotic
prescribing practices, we were able to test our hypothesis that there is no
relationship between patient satisfaction and performance on antibiotic
prescribing measures against the null hypothesis that there is an inverse
relationship between antibiotic prescribing practices and patient satisfaction by
using the antibiotic prescribing composite (“ABX”) as a measure in model two of
our analysis. Results of that model are displayed in Table 7.
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Table 7
OLS Results: Antibiotics Composite Model- Hypothesis 2
Number of obs:
F(19, 2924):
Prob > F:
R-squared:
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

2787
5.66
0.0000
0.0374
0.0308
1.0634

As shown in Table 7, there was not a statistically significant relationship
(.081) between patient satisfaction rating and the antibiotic prescribing
composite, ABX. Thus, we fail to reject our null hypothesis that there is no
relationship between patient satisfaction rating and antibiotic prescribing
performance. Based on this study, it appears that antibiotic prescribing practices
are not a significant predictor of patient satisfaction. Much like model one,
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medical school ranking and patient age remain statistically significant and
positive predictors of patient satisfaction, though the coefficient of both is near
zero. Also similar to model one, median household income of the patient’s city of
residence is still statistically significant and negatively associated with patient
satisfaction rating in this model. However, the coefficient remains near zero.
Unlike model one, physician gender is a statistically significant predictor (.000) of
patient satisfaction rating with a positive relationship meaning that patients are
more satisfied with male PCPs after controlling for other factors. There was no
evidence of heteroscedasticity in this model or any of the following models, so
robust standard errors were not used. The adjusted R-squared of this model was
.0308, meaning 3.08% of the variance in DoctorRating was predicted by the
model.

4.3

MODEL THREE: PREVENTIVE MEASURE COMPOSITE
In our third model, we predicted that patients are more satisfied with

physicians that perform better on preventive healthcare quality metrics because
preventive reminders serve as a signal of quality by showing interest in the
patient’s well-being and are less difficult to understand as opposed to our null
hypothesis that there is no relationship between performance on preventive
measures and patient satisfaction. Table 8 depicts the results of our analysis
using the preventive measure composite (“Preventive”).
The Preventive composite was not significant at the .05 level (.063).
Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship
between preventive measure performance and patient satisfaction. However, as
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in models one and two, medical school rank (.003) and patient age (.000) are
both statistically significant and positively associated with Preventive. Also like
the previous models, median income of the patient’s city continues to be
statistically significant and negatively associated with patient satisfaction, yet the
coefficient is near zero. In this model, as well as model two, provider gender of
male (.000) is statistically significant and positively associated with patient
satisfaction. Adjusted r-squared for model three was .0310, indicating 3.1% of the
variance in DoctorRating is accounted for within the model.

Table 8
OLS Results: Preventive Composite Model- Hypothesis 3
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4.4

MODEL FOUR: CHRONIC CARE COMPOSITE
For our fourth model, we predicted that patients are unable to ascertain

the technical quality related to chronic condition management and thus there is
no relationship between chronic disease management metrics and patient
satisfaction, versus the alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship between
patient satisfaction and performance on chronic disease metrics. Chronic
conditions and their labs, medications and other treatments are more complex to
understand and therefore, patients may not be able to determine clinical quality.
Table 9 shows the overall results of this model.
For model four, as predicted, we fail to reject our null hypothesis that there
is no relationship between performance on chronic care metrics and patient
satisfaction. The chronic care composite (“ChronicCare”) was not statistically
significant (.328) and was thus unrelated to patient satisfaction in this model. Like
previous models, medical school rank, provider gender of male and patient age
were all statistically significant and positively associated with patient satisfaction;
and the median household income of the patient’s city was statistically significant
and negatively associated with patient satisfaction, though the coefficient
remained near zero. Where being an allopathic physicians was borderline
significant in previous models, it is now statistically significant in this model (.015)
and positively associated with patient satisfaction indicating that patients are
more satisfied overall with allopathic PCPs as compared to osteopathic PCPs.
Adjusted R-squared remained around 3% as with previous models.
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Table 9
OLS Results: Chronic Care Composite Model- Hypothesis 4

4.5

MODEL FIVE: GENERIC PRESCRIBING METRIC
Model five in this analysis was unique in that it included the metric for

generic prescribing practices. It is the only model that includes a specific metric
that directly impacts patients financially outside of office copays and coinsurance.
If a physician performs well on the generic prescribing measure, patients’ out-ofpockets expenses are reduced and would likely contribute to their overall
satisfaction with their PCP. For that reason, we predicted that patients are more
satisfied with physicians that perform better on generic prescribing measures
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because it reduces their out of pocket expense. Again, our null hypothesis was
that there is no relationship between patient satisfaction and generic prescribing.
Table 10 reflects the outcomes of that analysis:
Table 10
OLS Results: Generic Prescribing Model- Hypothesis 5

As predicted, generic prescribing (“Generics”) was statistically significant
(.040) and positively associated with patient satisfaction, thus we reject our null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that patients are more satisfied
with physicians that perform better on generic prescribing measures. As in
previous models, medical school ranking (.002), provider gender of male (.000)
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and patient age (.000) were statistically significant and positively associated with
patient satisfaction; and median household income of the patient’s city of
residence continues to be statistically significant and negatively associated with
patient satisfaction, although the coefficient remains near zero. Adjusted Rsquared continues to be approximately 3% as in the previous models.

4.6

MODEL SIX: VACCINATION COMPOSITE
In the sixth and final model, we used a composite of the vaccine measures

(“Vaccine”) to assess the relationship with patient satisfaction. Much like
preventive measures, we predicted that patients are more satisfied with
physicians that perform better on vaccine related healthcare quality metrics
because vaccination reminders and administration serve as a signal of quality by
showing interest in the patient’s well-being and are less difficult to understand.
Again, our null hypothesis was that there is not a relationship between
vaccination administration performance and patient satisfaction. Table 11shows
the detailed results.
The composite for vaccine was statistically significant (.012) and positively
associated with patient satisfaction, meaning patients were more satisfied with
PCPs that performed better on vaccine administration quality metrics. Therefore,
we reject our null hypothesis that there is no relationship between patient
satisfaction and vaccination administration performance in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that “patients are more satisfied with physicians that perform better on
vaccine related healthcare quality metrics”. Because this composite was limited
to physicians in the family medicine or pediatrics specialties, each model was re-
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run to verify that results were similar in this sample. All significant results were
the same as in the broader sample.

Table 11
OLS Results: Vaccination Model- Hypothesis 6

As in previous models, medical school rank (.035), provider gender of
male (.001) and patient age (.000) were statistically significant and positively
associated with patient satisfaction; and median household income of the
patient’s city of residence (.003) continued to be statistically significant and
negatively associated with patient satisfaction. Provider age was statistically
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significant in this model, unlike the others and was negatively associated with
patient satisfaction. Interestingly, visit volume, meaning the volume of office visits
at the location where the patient was seen, was statistically significant in this
model and was positively associated with patient satisfaction. The interpretation
of this would be that patients are more satisfied with PCPs at higher volume
office locations, which is somewhat surprising. However, the coefficient is near
zero and the relationship was not positive in any of the other models.

4.7

SUMMARY RESULTS
Table 12 shows summary results for statistical significance across all six

models. “N” represents no statistically significant relationship; and “+” or “-”
represents the sign of the coefficient where there is a statistically significant
relationship. The summary table clearly shows the statistically significant and
positive relationship across all six models between medical school rank and
patient satisfaction and between patient age and patient satisfaction. These
results indicate that patients are more satisfied with PCPs that attended higher
ranked medical schools; and patients become more satisfied with their PCP as
they age. Additionally, in five of the six models, provider gender of male was
statistically significant and positively associated with patient satisfaction,
indicating patients are more satisfied with male PCPs as compared to females
even after controlling for the gender of the patient and other factors. Patient race
of Hispanic (as compared to Caucasian) and visit volume were each statistically
significant and positively associated with patient satisfaction, but only in one
model each.
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Table 12
Summary of Results Across Models

Likewise, being an allopathic physician was statistically significant and positively
associated with patient satisfaction in one model, but it was near the .05
significance in four of the other models (p-values of .051, .074, .060 and .055).
Based on the statistical significance in the chronic care model, it would appear
that patients may be more satisfied with allopathic PCPs as compared to
osteopathic PCP. Interestingly, wRVU which measures individual physician
productivity and served as an indicator of how busy each physician was in this
model, was not related to patient satisfaction; and as mentioned, visit volume, or
the volume of patients seen at a specific office location was weakly significant,
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showing significance in only one of six models. We do believe that our results are
generalizable to the larger population since we used all satisfaction results
received and the blends of PCP specialties, gender and other factors was robust.
We have no reason to believe that the quality performance of the sample
physicians is any different than the larger population.
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5.

DISCUSSION

5.1

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
As with previous studies assessing the relationship between patient

satisfaction and clinical quality in an ambulatory setting (Sequist, 2008)
(Schneider, 2001), our results are mixed. Unlike (Sequist, 2008) and (Schneider,
2001), our analysis utilized individual patient satisfaction results to the CGCAHPS survey (as opposed to a health plan CAHPS survey) and used a more
robust set of HEDIS measure results extracted from the provider EHR as
opposed to claims based data from health plan(s). Both data sets were
supplemented with physician and patient demographics and characteristics. In
line with our first hypothesis, patient satisfaction global ratings were not found to
be statistically significantly related to overall clinical quality as measured by a
robust set of HEDIS metrics. Based on this result, it appears that clinical quality
and patient satisfaction are separate domains and design of physician financial
incentives should take this into account.
Our study did have a low adjust R2 across all models. This could be
related to a number of factors. First, there are certain disciplines such as
psychology and other social sciences that often have low adjusted R2 values
because they predominantly assess or predict human behavior (Frost, 2013). In
our study, we are trying to predict the drivers of patient satisfaction, which is
directly based on human behavior and perception, which could certainly
contribute to the low R2 values. Additionally, we likely haven’t captured all of the
predictors of patient satisfaction in our model. Since our focus was on the
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relationship between clinical quality and patient satisfaction, we did not include
other predictors from the patient satisfaction survey that likely impact patient
satisfaction such as the patient’s evaluation of whether a physician listened
closely to them, explained things clearly; or whether the office staff were
courteous and helpful, as examples. Including these other aspects of patient
satisfaction may improve the overall R2 but would not offer additional contribution
to our assessment of the relationship between clinical quality and patient
satisfaction, particularly since previous studies have shown a positive
relationship between overall rating of a physician and the other physician related
metrics in the CG-CAHPS survey. However, further research should be
conducted to explore the other predictors of overall patient satisfaction rating.
Our study contributed significantly to the available research with our
analysis and findings assessing the relationship between antibiotic prescribing
practices and patient satisfaction. Based on the underlying theory of asymmetric
information, it is believed that patients lack the knowledge to understand when
they need antibiotics and thus may prefer physicians that perform worse on
antibiotic prescribing measures (those that prescribe antibiotics more often when
it is not indicated). Physician critics argue that they are incentivized to prescribe
antibiotics when not necessary so that they keep patients satisfied. Based on this
theory, we hypothesized that the antibiotic composite and patient satisfaction
would be negatively related, meaning patients would prefer those physicians that
performed worse on antibiotic prescribing measures. However, our analysis
showed no statistically significant association between antibiotic prescribing
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practices and patient satisfaction. While the two are unrelated, there is not an
inverse relationship as critics suspect related to issues of information asymmetry.
This information is extremely helpful for guidance in designing effective incentive
models and in explaining the usefulness of the measures to physicians.
Likewise, the two composites associated with preventive care and chronic
care failed to show a statistically significant relationship to patient satisfaction,
indicating again that clinical quality and patient satisfaction are separate, distinct
domains. However, we hypothesized that preventive care would show a positive
relationship due to preventive reminders serving as a signal of quality. This did
not hold true. Upon further consideration, it may be that while preventive
reminders serve as a signal for quality, they also include the less desirable
testing that patients tend to delay and/or not comply with such as pap smears,
mammograms and colonoscopies. Thus, performance on these metrics suffers
but does not negatively impact patient satisfaction. Regarding chronic care
metrics, we predicted that there would be no relationship between quality and
patient satisfaction. Chronic care measures are complex and difficult for patients
to understand, making them a challenging signal of quality to patients. Our
prediction held true in the analysis, showing no significant relationship between
chronic care metric performance and patient satisfaction.
We did identify two quality composites that were significantly related to
patient satisfaction—the generic prescribing measure and the vaccine composite.
We predicted that each of these measures would have a positive relationship
with patient satisfaction based on the theory that generic prescribing directly
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impacts patients financially; and, much like preventive measures, vaccine
administration would serve as a signal of quality to patients and/or their parents.
Unlike the majority of preventive measures, vaccines can be administered
directly in the physicians’ office, so the quality signal is not offset by delays in
testing. Our hypotheses were confirmed in our analysis, generic prescribing
performance was positive and statistically significantly associated with patient
satisfaction. Further, the vaccine composite was also positive and statistically
significantly associated with patient satisfaction.
Though not the focus of our study, several control variables did show
repeated statistical significance with patient satisfaction across most or all
models-- medical school ranking, provider gender of male, patient age (all
positive associations) and median income of the patient’s city of residence
(negative association). Because physician characteristics such as medical school
attended are not normally available in the data sources used for this type of
research, the medical school ranking has not been controlled for in previous
analyses. Our research showed a positive and statistically significant association
between medical school ranking and patient satisfaction across all six of our
models. While it is difficult to make inferences about these results, it could be that
higher ranked medical programs place more emphasis on training targeted at
characteristics that improve patient satisfaction. Further, provider gender of male
(as compared to female) was positive and statistically significant across five out
of six of our models. This result shows a preference for male PCPs after
controlling for other factors. And, patient age was positively associated with
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patient satisfaction, indicating that as patients age, they are more satisfied with
their PCP. This could be caused by multiple factors, including but not limited to
length of time the patient has been seeing their PCP or increasing likelihood of
health concerns as patients age. Lastly, median household income of the
patient’s city of residence was negatively associated with patient satisfaction,
meaning that patients who reside in lower income cities are more satisfied with
their physicians after controlling for other factors. Of note is that control variables
representing how busy the physician or their office location is (wRVU and Office
Visit Volume) were not related to patient satisfaction, nor was physician board
certification status.
Our results are practically important to those designing financial incentive
models for physicians, particularly where patient satisfaction and clinical quality
are both involved. It is clear from our analysis that metrics that have a direct
financial impact on patients, such as generic prescribing; and metrics that are
easy for patients to understand and can be performed directly in the physicians’
office are related to patient satisfaction. If an incentive program incorporates both
patient satisfaction and clinical quality, those metrics that are related to patient
satisfaction (i.e. where the patient is able to ascertain clinical quality) should be
left out of incentive models in order to reduce complexity of the models and
because patient satisfaction is already impacted by performance on those
metrics. Further, for metrics where there is a negative relationship, the incentives
may be in conflict, reducing the effectiveness of the incentive. The main concern
in terms of negative relationship is often with antibiotics and pain medications.
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We were unable to study pain medication prescribing, but the antibiotic concern
appears unfounded in our analysis. Additional studies looking at the individual
measures as opposed to composites would be helpful to further elucidate which
metrics are related to patient satisfaction and thus could be eliminated or handled
differently within incentive models due to redundancy or conflict.

5.2

CONCLUSIONS
The majority of our evidence shows that patient satisfaction and clinical

quality as measured by HEDIS metrics in an ambulatory setting are unrelated
domains of healthcare service. Our study provides patient level satisfaction data
and robust, provider based clinical metric performance results. Further, while we
have shown that overall patient satisfaction and clinical quality are unrelated,
there are certain metrics or groups of metrics that are statistically significant and
related to patient satisfaction, specifically generic prescribing and vaccine
administration. These metrics that are related to patient satisfaction are different
from other quality metrics in that they either 1) directly impact the patient
financially (generic prescribing) or 2) are an easily identifiable signal of quality to
the patient, i.e. the doctor recommended vaccines to keep the child healthy and
the vaccine could be administered in their office the same day. Other, more
complex measures are more greatly impacted by asymmetric information and
therefore are unrelated to quality.
Additionally, while we conclude that patient satisfaction and clinical quality
are separate domains overall, we also have shown that there is not an inverse
relationship between patient satisfaction and antibiotic prescribing practices as
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often cited by critics of tying physician financial incentives to patient satisfaction
results.
Our finding that there is not a relationship between most clinical quality
metrics and patient satisfaction is important to the effective design of provider
incentives going forward. While both patient satisfaction and clinical quality are
important they are mostly separate domains and financial incentives should be
structured accordingly. However, there are certain metrics that appear to be
related to patient satisfaction. These metrics, such as generic prescribing
percentage and vaccine administration could be excluded from incentive
programs because their performance is already accounted for in patient
satisfaction measurement. On the contrary, if there are metrics that show an
inverse relationship, the weight of the clinical quality metric should be increased
to offset the impact of the inverse relationship and incentivize quality even at the
cost of reduced satisfaction. Further studies that assess the relationship between
individual metrics and patient satisfaction should be conducted in order to
appropriately incentivize provider behavior.
Overall, our findings show that from a policy perspective, performance
incentives may be structured incorrectly. Physician reimbursement and incentive
models are being structured and implemented without a clear understanding of
their implications. Taking these findings into consideration and including this type
of analysis in the design of incentives is important to driving our healthcare
system to a more value based structure. Ultimately, policymakers, health plans
and provider systems charged with designing physician financial incentives in the
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evolving value based system should consider the different domains of healthcare
services and align incentives with desired outcomes and behavioral changes.
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APPENDIX 2: SCHEDULE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Appendix 2
Schedule of Abbreviations
Abbreviation
ACA
ACEI
ACES
ACO or ACOs
ACVE
AHRQ
AMI
APM
ARB
BP
BUN
CABG
CAHPS
CHIP
CMS
DO
EHR or EHRs
EP or EPs
FFS
FOBT
FP
GDP
GYN
HbA1C
HEDIS
HHS
HIE
IM
LDL
MACRA
MD
MEI
MEPS
MGMA
MIPS
MMR

Description
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Angiotensin Converting Enzyme Inhibitors
Ambulatory Care Experiences Survey
Accountable Care Organization(s)
Assessing Care of Vulnerable Elders
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Acute Myocardial Infarction
Alternative Payment Models
Angiotensin II Receptor Blockers
Blood Pressure
Blood Urea Nitrogen Test
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers & Systems
Children's Health Insurance Program
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Doctor of Osteopathy
Electronic Health Record(s)
Eligible Professional(s)
Fee-For-Service
Fecal Occult Blood Test
Family Practice
Gross Domestic Product
Gynecology
Hemoglobin A1C Test
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set
The US Department of Health & Human Services
Health Insurance Experiment
Internal Medicine
Low Density Lipoprotein
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015
Medical Doctor
Medicare Economic Index
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
The Medical Group Management Association
Merit-Based Incentive Payment System
Measles, Mumps, Rubella Vaccination
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MU
NBER
NCQA
NHE
OECD
OLS
PCI
PCMH
PCP
Peds
PFS
PHO
PQRS
RBRVS
Rx
SCP
SGR
URI
VBPM
VZV
wRVU

Meaningful Use
The National Bureau of Economic Research
The National Committee for Quality Assurance
National Health Expenditure
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
Ordinary Least Squares
Percutaneous Coronary Intervention
Patient Centered Medical Home
Primary Care Physician
Pediatrics
Physician Fee Schedule
Physician Hospital Organization
Physician Quality Reporting System
Resource Based Relative Value Scale
Prescription
Specialty Care Physician
Sustainable Growth Rate
Upper Respiratory Infection
Value Based Payment Modifier
Varicella Zoster Vaccine (Chicken pox)
Physician Work Relative Value Unit

